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CHAPTER 12 
Constitutional Law 
WILLIAM T. CORBETT* 
§ 12.1. Due Process- PubHc Funded Abortions. In Moe v. Secretary of 
Administration and Finance, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that 
provisions affecting the Massachusetts Medical Assistance Program 
(Medicaid), 2 limiting state funding of abortions only to those necessary to 
prevent the death of the mother, 3 violated the due process guarantee of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 4 This case has additional significance 
• WILLIAM T. CORBETT is an Associate Professor of Law at Suffolk University Law 
School. 
§ 12.1. ' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 464, 417 N.E.2d 387. 
' G.L. c. 118E, § 1 et seq. 
' These provisions, popularly referred to as the Dogie-Flynn amendments, actually con-
sisted of several pieces of legislation. The legislation affected was as follows: G.L. c. 29, § 20B 
provides: 
No account or demand approved by the head of a department, office, commission or in-
stitution for which it was contracted, requiring the certification of the comptroller or 
warrant of the governor shall be paid from an appropriation for an abortion, as defined 
in section twelve K of chapter one hundred and twelve except for an abortion where the 
attending physician has certified in writing that the abortion is necessary to prevent the 
death of the mother. 
The Medicaid appropriations bill for fiscal year 1979, enacted in 1978 Mass. Acts c. 367, § 2 
Item 4402-SOOO, provides in pertinent part: 
and provided, further that no funds appropriated under this item shall be expended for 
the payment of abortions not necessary to prevent the death of the mother. This provi-
sion does not prohibit payment for medical procedures necessary for the prompt treat-
ment of the victims of forced rape or incest if such rape or incest is reported to a licensed 
hospital or law enforcement agency within thirty days after said incident. 
The Medicaid appropriations bill for fiscal years 1980 and 1981 contained an identical restric-
tion. 1979 Mass. Acts c. 393, § 2 Item 4402-SOOO and 1980 Mass. Acts c. 329, § 2 Item 
4402-SOOO provided in pertinent part "that no funds appropriated under this item shall be ex-
pended for the payment of abortions not necessary to prevent the death of the mother." The 
only appropriations measure that still could be enforced at the time of the decision was chapter 
329. 
• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 480, 417 N.E.2d at 397. Although the Court decided the case on 
due process grounds, the plaintiffs also claimed that the provisions violated the constitutional 
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because seven months earlier, in the companion cases of Harris v. McRae, 5 
and Williams v. Zbaraz, 6 the United States Supreme Court held that virtual-
ly identical restrictions contained in the Hyde Amendment, 7 and in an Il-
guarantee of equal protection and the Equal Rights Amendment. Id. at 467-68, 480-81, 417 
N .E.2d at 390, 397. According to the Court, the principles of due process are embodied in Part 
I articles 1, 10 and 12 and Part II, c. 1, § 1 art. 4 of the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. at 468 
n.4, 417 N.E.2d at 390 n.4. Article 1 provides: 
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable 
rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives 
and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of seek-
ing and obtaining their safety and happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied 
or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin. 
Article 10 provides in part: 
Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his 
life, liberty and property, according to standing laws. He is obliged, consequently, to 
contribute his share to the expense of this protection; to give his personal service, or an 
equivalent, when necessary: but no part of the property of any individual can, with 
justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that 
of the representative body of the people. In fine, the people of this commonwealth are 
not controllable by any other laws than those to which their constitutional represent-
ative body have given their consent. And whenever the public exigencies require that the 
property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a 
reasonable compensation therefor. 
Article 12 provides in pertinent part: 
"[N]o subject shall be ... deprived of his property, immunities or privileges ... or de-
prived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the 
land." Part II, c. l, § 1 art. 4 empowers the Legislature to make "all manner of whole-
some and reasonable ... laws ... so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this 
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of this 
Commonwealth." 
' 448 u.s. 297 (1980) . 
• 448 u.s. 358 (1980). 
' The Hyde Amendment affected the annual appropriations for the then Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare (Department of Health and Human Services). As initially 
passed in 1976, effective for fiscal year 1977, it prohibited federal reimbursement for abortions 
"except where the life of the mother would be endangered if carried to term." Pub. L. No. 
94-439, § 209,90 Stat. 1434 (1976). The versions applicable for most of fiscal year 1978, and all 
of fiscal year 1979, extended the scope of reimbursement by adding two additional exceptions. 
Federal funds would be available 
for such medical procedures necessary for the victims of rape or incest, when such rape 
or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health serv-
ice; ... [and] in those instances where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to 
the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by 
two physicians. 
Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1978) and Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1586 
(1979). 
The version passed in 1979 for fiscal year 1980 retained the "life of the mother" and the 
"rape or incest" exceptions but deleted the "long-lasting physical health damage" exception. 
Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979). Harris v. McRae upheld the constitutionality of 
all three versions. 448 U.S. at 303, 326-27. 
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linois statute• respectively, violated neither the fifth' nor the fourteenth 10 
amendment to the United States Constitution. 
In order to better understand Moe, a brief summary of Medicaid and the 
controversy surrounding public funding of abortions is necessary. In 1965 
Congress added Title XIX11 (Medicaid) to the already existing Social Securi-
ty Act. 12 The linchpin of Medicaid is the sharing of costs between the states 
and federal government incurred in the delivery of health care to the finan-
cially disadvantaged. 13 No state is required to participate in Medicaid. 
However, if a state does choose to participate, that state must provide five 
general types of medical services 14 to the "categorically needy."" Although 
Title XIX does not specify the actual services that the state's plan must in-
clude, it does require that the plan include "reasonable standards . . . for 
determining eligibility for, and the extent of medical assistance . . . which 
... are consistent with the objectives of [Title XIX]." 16 
In 1969, Massachusetts created the Massachusetts Medical Assistance 
Program.t 7 Under this plan a broad number of services is provided subject 
to the standard of "medical necessity" as defined in the Massachusetts 
Code of Regulations. 11 
' ILL. REv. STAT. c. 23 prohibits state medical assistance payments for "abortion, or induced 
miscarriages or premature births, unless, in the opinion of a physician, such procedures are 
necessary for the preservation of the life of the woman seeking such treatment. .. " /d. 
' 448 U.S. at 318, 326. The Court held that the Hyde Amendment violated neither due proc-
ess nor equal protection. Although the fifth amendment contains no equal protection clause, 
the Supreme Court has held that the guarantee of equality is embodied within the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The fifth 
amendment provides, in pertinent part, "nor shall any person ... be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
'" 448 U.S. at 369. The Court examined the Illinois statute only under the equal protection 
clause. The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part that "[n)o State shall ... deny to 
any person ... the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV. 
"42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (1976). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1976). 
" Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 308; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968). 
14 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (1976). The required services are: "(1) inpatient hospital services 
... ; (2) outpatient hospital services; (3) ... laboratory and X-ray services; (4)(A) skilled nurs-
ing facility services ... (B) ... early and periodic screening and diagnosis of [children) ... to 
ascertain their physical or mental defects ... (C) family planning services ... ; (5) physician 
services .... " 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(B) (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(1)-(5) (1976). 
" 42 U .S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(B) describes the "categorically needy" as "individuals receiving 
aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under subchapter I [aged], X [blind], 
XIV [disabled), or XVI [supplemental security income for the aged, blind and disabled) or part 
A of subchapter IV [aid to families with dependent children] of this [Social Security) 
chapter .... " 
16 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1976). 
" G.L. c. 118E, § 1 et seq. 
" /d. A service is "medically necessary" if it is: 
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Massachusetts first attempted to limit public funding of abortions in 
July, 1978, when it passed chapter 367 of the Acts and ResolvesY This 
legislation, which was attached as a rider to the state's 1979 fiscal year 
Medicaid appropriations bill, limited state reimbursement for abortions on-
ly to those necessary to prevent the death of the mother or in certain cases of 
rape or incest. 2° From 1973 until the time of Moe, Massachusetts had fund-
ed abortions coextensive with the rights recognized in the United States 
Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade. 21 
The federal government, on the other hand, first passed legislation 
limiting federal Medicaid reimbursement for abortions in 1976. 22 This 
legislation, commonly referred to as the Hyde Amendment, 23 was im-
mediately challenged in federal court in New York on grounds that it 
violated, among others, rights under the fifth amendment to the United 
States Constitution. 24 On January 15, 1980, a United States District Court 
in New York held the Hyde Amendment unconstitutional. B 
Chapter 367 was challenged in Massachusetts federal court immediately 
after its passage on grounds that it violated both the fourteenth amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Title XIX. 26 Although the district 
court found chapter 367 a violation of the "reasonable standards" provi-
sion of Title XIX, it also concluded that the Hyde Amendment constituted a 
substantive amendment to Title XIX. 27 Because the court concluded that 
states participating in Medicaid need not pay the costs of any medical serv-
ice not eligible for federal reimbursement, the court refused to order the 
Commonwealth to fund medically necessary abortions. 28 Shortly thereafter, 
the First Circuit ordered Massachusetts to continue to pay for medically 
(1) reasonable calculated to prevent, diagnose, prevent the worsening of, alleviate, cor-
rect, or cure conditions in the recipient that endanger life, cause suffering or pain, cause 
physical deformity or malfunction, threaten to cause or to aggravate a handicap, or 
result in illness or infirmity; and (2) there is no other equally effective course of treat-
ment available or suitable for the recipient requesting the service that is more conserv-
ative or substantially less costly. 
Mass. Admin. Code Tit. 106, § 450.204 (1979). 
" 1978 Mass. Acts c. 367, § 2, Item 4402-5000. See supra note 3 for the pertinent text of this 
legislation. 
•• Id. 
21 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 470, 417 N.E.2d at 391. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
" Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434. This legislation is commonly referred to as the 
Hyde Amendment after its original House sponsor. /d. For a description of the pertinent por-
tion of the texts of the different versions of the Hyde Amendment see supra note 7. 
" /d. 
•• McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
" /d. 
" Jaffe v. Sharp, 463 F. Supp. 222, 225 (D. Mass. 1978). 
27 /d. at 230. 
"/d. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1981 [1981], Art. 15
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1981/iss1/15
§ 12.1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 283 
necessary abortions until it had a chance to hear arguments and to render a 
decision on the merits. 29 The court of appeals subsequently heard the appeal 
and, after agreeing with the lower court's statutory ruling, 30 remanded the 
case to the district court for consideration of the constitutional issues raised 
earlier but not decided. 31 
On June 30, 1980, the United States Supreme Court rendered decisions in 
Harris v. McRae32 and Williams v. Zbaraz. 33 Those cases held that a state 
government's refusal to fund medically necessary abortions, not endanger-
ing the mother's life, violated neither the federal constitutional guarantees 
of due process nor equal protection. 34 Shortly thereafter, Massachusetts an-
nounced that it intended to abide by the restriction contained in chapter 329 
of the 1980 Acts and Resolves35 and thereby reimburse only for those abor-
tions deemed necessary to protect the life of the mother. 36 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 472, 417 N.E.2d at 392. 
•• Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 134 (1979). The court agreed that the Com-
monwealth's failure to fund medically necessary abortions violated Title XIX. /d. at 127. 
However, it further concluded that the Hyde Amendment substantively amended Title XIX 
and thereby relieved the Commonwealth from what otherwise would have been its obligation 
to provide for such abortions. /d. at 134. In Harris v. McRae, the Court concluded that Con-
gress never intended participating states to fund the cost of any medical service when federal 
reimbursement was unavailable. 448 U.S. 297, 309-10 (1979). The United States Supreme 
Court therefore found it unnecessary to resolve the question of whether the Hyde Amendment 
constituted a substantive amendment to Title XIX. /d. at 310 n.l4. See also infra note 34. 
" 591 F.2d at 134. The court of appeals continued its prior order enjoining implementation 
of the funding restriction pending the Commonwealth's petition for writ of certiorari. /d. the 
petition was denied, 441 U.S. 952, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 888 (1979). 
" 448 u.s. 297 (1980). 
" 448 u.s. 358 (1980). 
" 448 U.S. at 318, 326-27 (regarding fifth amendment guarantees of due process and equal 
protection); 448 U.S. at 369 (regarding fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection). 
In Ha"is, the Court also decided the statutory question of whether Title XIX imposed an in-
dependent obligation on participating states to fund the entire cost of medically necessary 
abortions. The issue arose, of course, as a result of the Hyde Amendment's restriction on 
federal reimbursement. It was argued that a state's refusal to provide for such abortions 
violated the "reasonable standard" provision of Title XIX. This argument seemingly found 
support in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). In Beal the Court held that Title XIX did notre-
quire participating states to fund medically unnecessary abortions. However, the Court men-
tioned that "serious statutory questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded 
necessary medical treatment from its coverage .... '' /d. at 444. As noted in Harris, however, 
Beal had not considered the effect that the Hyde Amendment would have on Title XIX. 448 
U.S. at 307 n.ll. Harris noted that the touchstone of Medicaid is the sharing of costs between 
the state and federal government, and that Congress never intended that the states would have 
to assume the entire cost of any medical service. Id. at 308-09. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 473, 417 N.E.2d at 393. The legislation effective for fiscal year 
1981 is found in 1981 Mass. Acts c. 329, § 2, Item 4402-5000. For a description of this legisla-
tion see supra note 3. 
" See 1980 Mass. Acts c. 329. Unlike chapter 367, which, in addition, contained a "rape or 
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Moe clearly illustrates that a state constitutional provision may accord an 
individual more protection than a similar provision in the federal counter-
part. 37 What is not so apparent, however, at least initially, is the reason why 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Moe reached a conclusion different from that 
of the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. McRae and Williams v. 
Zbaraz. A possible explanation could be that the right protected under the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is substantively different, from, and 
broader than, the right protected under the United States Constitution. 
That does not seem to be the case, however. 
At the outset of the opinion, after disposing of some preliminary ques-
tions, 31 Justice Quirico explained the formulation by which the Court would 
analyze plaintiffs' claim. First, the Court would examine the nature of the 
right claimed to be impaired by chapter 329.39 Second, the Court would 
determine the degree to which chapter 329 impaired the exercise of that 
incest" exception, chapter 329 only excepted abortions necessary to protect the mother's life. 
/d. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 484,486,417 N.E.2d at 399,400. See also, Wilkins Judicial Treat-
ment of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights in Relation to Cognate Provisions of the 
United States Constitution, 14 SUFF. U. L. REv. 887 (1980). 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 476-80, 417 N.E.2d at 396-97. The Commonwealth argued that 
the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that because the restriction con-
cerned an appropriations measure, and because appropriations are solely a legislative concern, 
the Court would violate the principle of separation of powers, as embodied in article 30 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, were it to decide the case. This argument was rejected for 
several reasons. First, the funds already had been appropriated by the legislature. Second, 
regardless of how the Court resolved the issue, its action would not cause only additional 
expenditures; indeed, a decision striking down the legislation conceivably would result in less 
expenditures since the medical costs of childbirth tend to be higher than those of abortion. 
Third, simply because legislative action involves appropriations, that action is not necessarily 
insulated from judicial review. /d. at 476-77. 
Sua sponte, the Court considered whether the case could be resolved on statutory grounds 
and thereby remove from consideration the constitutional question. As noted by the Court, 
chapter 329 permitted reimbursement only for those abortions necessary to save the mother's 
life. Yet, the then current version of the Hyde Amendment permitted federal funding not only 
for abortions necessary to preserve the woman's life, but also, in certain instances of rape or 
incest. Since chapter 329 was more restrictive than the Hyde Amendment, then, pursuant to the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, chapter 329 would fall. As noted by the 
Court, the question then would be whether chapter 329 should be set aside entirely or only so 
far as it was repugnant to the Hyde Amendment. At least one court, confronted with the same 
issue, invalidated the entire state law. See Roe v. Casey, 623 F.2d 829, 839 (3d Cir. 1980). 
However, in 1980 Congress passed legislation providing that "[s]tates are and shall remain free 
not to fund abortions to the extent that they in their sole discretion deem appropriate." Pub. 
L. No. 96-536, § 109,94 Stat. 3170 (1980). Concluding then that no statutory ground existed by 
which the case could be decided, the Court proceeded to the constitutional question. 1981 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 479-80, 417 N.E.2d at 396. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 481-85, 417 N.E.2d at 397-99. 
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right. 4° Finally, assuming that the right was impaired, the Court would con-
sider whether any state interests justified its impairment. 41 
Although, after analyzing the first issue, the Court remarked "having 
[now] defmed the right involved we turn to the question whether it is in-
fringed by the funding restriction'', 42 the Court simply never did specify 
clearly the "right involved." Nor did it indicate whether that right was, in 
some way, different from the right protected under the federal constitution. 
Roe v. Wade, 43 of course, established the basic formulation of individual 
and state rights in the abortion context. 44 As explained by the Supreme 
Court in Maher v. Roe, 4 ' and later in Harris v. McRae, 46 the principle of 
Wade is the protection of a woman "from unduly burdensome interference 
with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy." 47 Moe 
acknowledged Wade as the touchstone. 41 However, the majority, in citing 
from its recent decision In the Matter of Spring, 49 noted: 
something approaching consensus in support of the principle that a person has 
a stong interest in being free from non-consensual invasion of his bodily integ-
rity, and a constitutional right of privacy that may be asserted to prevent un-
wanted infringements of bodily integrity.'0 
Arguably, the freedom to choose abortion over childbirth is different from, 
and perhaps narrower than, the right to be free from involuntary bodily in-
trusions. If this is the case, then, of course, the different result reached by 
the state's and the nation's highest court is easily explained. Indeed, Chief 
Justice Hennessey, in dissent, criticized the majority for broadening the 
right recognized in Wade. n However, in quoting from its decision in Fram-
•• Id. at 481, 48S-91, 417 N.E.2d at 397, 400-02. 
•• Id. at 481, 491-9S, 417 N.E.2d at 397, 402-04. 
42 Id. at 48S, 417 N.E.2d at 399 . 
•• 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
•• Id. at 1S3-6S. The fourteenth amendment recognizes a right of privacy in the context of 
decisions regarding abortion and childbirth. That right is fundamental. Consequently, a state 
cannot impair the exercise of that right unless it can demonstrate a compelling justification for 
so doing, and, even then, only if it proceeds in the least restrictive manner. Two state interests 
recognized in the abortion context are the health of the mother and the potential life of the un-
born. Each of these interests becomes compelling during different stages of the gestation proc-
ess. In the second trimester the state's interest in the woman's health is sufficiently compelling 
such that the state can take action designed to promote the health. At the point of viability, ap-
proximately the third trimester, the state's interest in protecting the unborn is sufficiently com-
pelling so as to permit the state to prohibit abortion altogether; assuming, of course, the abor-
tion is not necessary to protect the woman's health. Id. at 1S3-6S . 
• , 432 u.s 464 (1977). 
•• 448 U.S. at 314 . 
., Id. (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 473-74). 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 481, 417 N.E.2d at 397. 
•• 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1209, 1214, 40S N.E.2d llS, 118. 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 484, 417 N.E.2d at 399. 
" Id. at 498, 417 N.E.2d at 406. 
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ingham Clinic, Inc. v. Southborough, 52 the Court explained the principle of 
Wade as "forbid[ing] the State [from] interpos[ing] material obstacles to 
the effectuation of a woman's counselled decision to terminate her pregnan-
cy during the first trimester.''' 3 1t would seem then that the right recognized 
in Moe is substantively the same as the interest protected under Wade. 
The question considered next was whether the funding restriction im-
posed by chapter 329 impaired an indigent woman's right to choose. 54 Here 
a difference between Moe and Harris is apparent. The Harris majority 
noted that nothing in Wade suggested that the government could not make 
a "value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion ... "" Indeed, Wade 
recognized the state's important interest in protecting potential life, 56 an in-
terest which becomes compelling at viability. 57 Both Harris" and Maher v. 
Roe" reasoned that there is a real difference between direct government 
interference with a protected right and government sanctioned activity 
believed to be in the public interest. The Hyde Amendment was viewed not 
as a barrier to an indigent woman's protected right to choose, but rather, as 
a permissible means of effectuating the public good. 60 Although it is true 
that an indigent woman who lacks the funds needed for a desired abortion 
may be forced to carry her fetus to term, it simply does not follow that this 
enforced pregnancy is the product of direct governmental intervention. 6 ' 
According to a majority of the Supreme Court: 
" 373 Mass. 279, 367 N.E.2d 606 (1977). 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 483, 417 N.E.2d at 398 (quoting Framingham Clinic, Inc. v. 
Southborough, 373 Mass. at 288, 367 N.E.2d at 611). 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 485-91, 417 N.E.2d at 400-02. 
" 448 U.S. at 314 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474). 
" 410 U.S. at 159. 
" 448 U.S. at 315. 
" 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977). Maher concluded that a Medicaid participating state's decision 
not to fund medically unnecessary abortions did not violate equal protection. 
" This is a critical distinction between Moe and Harris. Moe reasoned that the Com-
monwealth had a clear obligation to remain neutral. It could neither encourage nor discourage 
a woman from terminating or continuing her pregnancy; assuming of course the fetus was not 
yet viable. Harris and Maher, on the other hand, emphasized the negative principle of Wade: a 
woman has a right to be free from burdensome state interference regarding the decision to bear 
or beget a child. Indeed, in both Harris and Maher the Court stated: "[c]onstitutional concerns 
are greatest when the state attempts to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to en-
courage actions deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader." 448 U.S. at 315; 
432 U.S. at 476. In explaining this principle, Harris cited Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). After Griswold, states cannot 
prohibit the use of contraceptives. Pursuant to Pierce, states cannot prohibit parents from 
sending their children to non-public schools. Yet it does not follow that states have an obliga-
tion to provide contraceptives to those who can't afford them or to fund non-public schools. 
448 U.S. at 318. 
" 448 U.S. at 314-15; 432 U.S. at 475. 
11 448 U.S. at 315-16; 432 U.S. at 474. 
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[A] woman's freedom of choice [does not] carr[y] with it a constitutional enti-
tlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected 
choices . . . [A]lthough government may not place obstacles in the path of a 
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its 
own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category. 62 
According to Harris, a finding that the Hyde Amendment violated due 
process would rest on a premise that women have a constitutional right to a 
medically necessary abortion. 63 Therefore, Congress would have an affirm-
ative obligation to fund such procedures. 64 Yet Congress was never under 
an obligation to create Medicaid or, for that matter, to fund any medically 
necessary services at all. 6 ' 
The Supreme Judicial Court acknowledged that under the Massachusetts 
Constitution, a woman enjoyed neither an independent right to an abor-
tion, nor a right to a publicly funded medically necessary abortion. 66 The 
fault of the Massachusetts funding scheme lay in its disparate treatment. 67 
Medicaid funded the medically necessary costs of childbirth yet not the 
medically necessary costs of abortion. Although the United States Supreme 
Court relied heavily on the distinction between direct government in-
terference and governmental encouragement of alternate activity, the 
Supreme Judicial Court did not. According to Justice Quirico "when the 
question is whether a selective grant of benefits impinges on a right held to 
" 448 U.S. at 316 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474). 
63 448 U.S. at 318 . 
•• /d. 
" 432 U.S. at 469. 
66 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 487, 417 N.E.2d at 400. 
" It is surprising that the Court adjudicated this case on due process, and not on equal pro-
tection, grounds. In Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp. 660,663 (D. Conn. 1975), Zbaraz v. Quem, 
469 F. Supp. 1212, 1221 (N.D. Ill. 1979) and McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630,737 (1980) 
(the lower court decisions in Maher v. Roe, Williams v. Zbaraz and Haris v. McRae respective-
ly), each court emphasized the disparate treatment accorded abortion funding vis a vis other 
Medicaid services, and each court decided its case on equal protection grounds. Indeed, in 
Maher v. Roe, the Court commented on the lower court's acknowledgment that the constitu-
tion confers no independent right to a state financed abortion. 432 U.S. at 468. In Moe the 
plaintiffs recognized that women do not have either an independent right to abortions general-
ly or to public funded abortions specifically. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 487, 417 N.E.2d at 
400-01. Rather their "claim [was) ... limited to an assertion of the right to have abortions 
nondiscriminatorily funded." Id., 417 N.E.2d at 401 (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 
106, 118-19 n.7 (1976)). Clearly then, the gravamen of the plaintiffs' complaint concerned the 
validity of the Commonwealth's classificatory scheme. Apart from equal participation in the 
electoral process, the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is not a repository 
of constitutional rights. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1971). It is designed 
to measure the validity of classifications, San Antonio v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1973) 
(Stewart, J ., concurring); precisely the nature of plaintiffs' claim in Moe. This case, of course, 
was decided under the state, and not the federal, constitution. Nevertheless, it seems equal pro-
tection would have been a preferred mode of adjudication. 
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be fundamental it is unimportant whether the burden is direct or 
indirect.''" As viewed by the Court, chapter 329 simply was an attempt by 
the Commonwealth to discourage indigent women from choosing 
abortion." Since the state therefore violated its role of neutrality, the only 
question remaining was whether it had sufficient justifications for doing 
S0. 70 
Under the federal scheme of adjudication, legislation challenged as im-
pairing the exercise of a fundamental right is subjected to so-called "strict 
scrutiny". 71 Unless the government can demonstrate that the legislation 
serves a compelling interest and that it is the least restrictive means of 
achieving that interest, it will not withstand attack. 72 Roe v. Wade recog-
nized two state interests, each of which becomes compelling at various 
stages of the gestation process. 73 The first interest, the woman's health, 
becomes compelling at the end of the first trimester, and, the second, 74 pro-
tecting the potential life of the fetus, becomes compelling upon the fetus 
reaching viability. 75 A state, therefore, if it so desired, could prevent a 
woman from aborting a viable fetus provided that in doing so this action 
did not jeopardize the woman's health. Protecting the mother's health cer-
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 488, 417 N.E.2d at 401. 
" /d. at 490, 417 N.E.2d at 402. 
'
0 Id. at 491, 417 N.E.2d at 401-02. 
" 448 U.S. at 470. See also Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 
312, 314 (1976); San Antonio v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). Strict scrutiny also is applied 
where the governmental action is predicated on a suspect classification. 448 U.S. at 470; 427 
U.S. at 312; 411 U.S. at 17. As described in San Antonio v. Rodriquez, a suspect class is a 
"class ... saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraor-
dinary protection from the majoritarian political process." 411 U.S. at 28. 
In McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (1980) (the lower court proceeding in Harris v. 
McRae), the court indicated that the Hyde Amendment affected a suspect class, namely in-
digent adolescent women; particularly those under age 18. Id. at 738. Apparently this conclu-
sion was premised on the fact that such women had a disproportionately higher need for 
medically necessary abortions. However, as noted in Harris v. McRae, the lower court's 
analysis is flawed. 448 U.S. at 323 n.26. Initially, age is not a suspect class. Massachusetts 
Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14. Secondly, heightened review will not be 
triggered unless the discrimination is purposeful. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 
(1976). The Hyde Amendment was age neutral. As explained in Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256 (1979) where a facially neutral statute is challenged as denying equal protecion, it 
must be shown that the action was taken "because of" and not simply "in spite of" the impact 
that it has on the affected group. Id. at 279. It could hardly be said that Congress enacted the 
Hyde Amendment because of its desire to disadvantage indigent adolescent women. 
12 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); San Antonio v. 
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-31, 51 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). 
" 410 U.S. at 159, 162. 
,. Id. at 163. 
" /d. 
10
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tainly was not the aim of chapter 329. Furthermore, because protecting 
potential life becomes compelling only when the fetus reaches viability, and 
because the funding restriction was not limited to previability abortions, 
chapter 329 would not be recognized as compelling under the federal 
scheme of analysis. The Supreme Judicial Court, however, suggested that 
its method of analysis is not as ritualistic as the federal formulation. 76 
Rather, the Court explained, it prefers to examine the state's interests in the 
matter and to weigh those interests against the implicated rights of the in-
dividual. 77 Citing its recent decisions in Commissioner v. Myers, 71 and 
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 19 the Court reiterated four state 
concerns often present in cases involving involuntary bodily intrusions. 
These concerns are: 1) preservation of life, 2) protection of innocent third 
parties, 3) prevention of suicide, and 4) maintenance of the ethical integrity 
of the medical profession. 10 The only state inter:est seriously implicated here 
was the preservation of life;11 albeit the life of the unborn. On the other 
hand, the funding restriction prevented indigent women from obtaining a 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 491, 417 N.E.2d at 463 (quoting Marcoux v. Attorney General, 
375 Mass. 63, 375 N.E.2d 688 (1978)). As stated in Marcoux: 
The cases at times speak of legislation which need only undergo a test of ''reasonable re-
lation" and legislation that must survive "strict scrutiny," but we conceive that these 
soubriquets are a shorthand for referring to the opposite ends of a continuum of consti-
tutional vulnerability determined at every point by the competing values involved. 
/d. at 65 n.4, 375 N.E.2d at 689 n.4. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 491-93, 417 N.E.2d at 402-04. 
" 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979). In Myers, a prison inmate developed a serious 
kidney disease while incarcerated. In order for him to survive he was required to undergo 
hemodialysis three times a week. After receiving these treatments for approximately one year, 
the inmate indicated that he would no longer submit to them. His refusal was not grounded on 
any religious beliefs or on a desire to die. Apparently, he was displeased with his placement in a 
medium, as opposed to a minimum, security facility. The court noted that the bodily intrusion 
was substantial. It further observed that the primary state interest implicated was the preserva-
tion of life. Those two interests yielded a close balance. What tipped the scales in the Com-
monwealth's favor was its interest in maintaining order in the administration of its prisons. /d. 
at 263-64, 399 N.E.2d at 454-58. 
" 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). In Saihewicz a 67 year old incompetent man who 
had been institutionalized most of his life, contracted leukemia. If the man were to undergo 
chemotherapy there was a 30-400Jo chance of a remission lasting up from 2-13 months. Without 
the chemotherapy his life expectancy was only a few months. His death, however, would be 
relatively painless. In order for the therapy to be successfully administered his cooperation 
would be needed. Yet, due to his incompetency, he was incapable of voluntarily providing the 
necessary assistance. In addition, the chemotherapy had numerous unpleasant side effects. The 
Commonwealth's principal interest in preservation of life was not sufficient to overcome the 
individual's interest in preventing unwanted bodily intrusions. /d. at 744-45, 370 N.E.2d at 
420-27. 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 493, 417 N.E.2d at 404. 
" /d. at 494, 417 N.E.2d at 404. 
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desired abortion. Perceiving this enforced pregnancy as an involuntary 
bodily intrusion, 12 and weighing the woman's interest in being free from 
such nonconsensual invasions against the state's interest in preserving 
potential life, the Court concluded that the balance clearly favored the 
woman. 13 Therefore, having determined that the Commonwealth breached 
its role of neutrality regarding the woman's right to choose abortion over 
childbirth, and having found no overriding justification for the Com-
monwealth's action, the Court held that the-legislation violated the Declara-
tion of Rights' guarantee of due process. 84 
§ 12.2. Freedom of Religion - Adjudicating Church Property Disputes. 
In Antioch Temple, Inc. v. Parekh, 1 the Court concluded that the guaran-
tee of freedom of religion protected under the first amendment to the 
United States Constitution2 did not bar the courts of the Commonwealth 
from adjudicating a claim between rival factions of a church group concern-
ing disputed ownership and control of church property. 3 Significantly, 
albeit in dicta, the Court suggested that it would adopt the neutral principle 
of laws method4 for resolving church property disputes recently enunciated 
by the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf.' 
Antioch Temple and William Tompkins, who claimed to be Antioch's 
president and pastor, initiated the action against Edith Parekh seeking to 
recover property standing in her name, but which they claimed was held by 
her as trustee for Antioch. 6 The case was submitted to a master to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 7 Two years after this action had 
12 /d. 
" /d. at 495, 417 N.E.2d at 404. 
14 /d. at 481, 495, 417 N.E.2d at 397, 404. 
§ 12.2. ' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1523, 422 N.E.2d 1337. 
• U.S. CONST. amend. I provides in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; ... '' The first amendment is 
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1534-35, 422 N.E.2d at 1344. Although the Court described this 
case as a church property dispute, possibly it is more than that. Although one issue did concern 
ownership and use of church property, a dispute as to who was the true pastor and president of 
Antioch Temple also was resolved by the superior court. /d. at 1535, 422 N.E.2d at 1344. 
Arguably this second issue is ecclesiastical and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. 
See i'lfra note 62. 
• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1535-38, 422 N.E.2d at 1345-46. For a discussion of this method 
see i'lfra note 60. 
' /d. at 1536-38, 422 N.E.2d at 1345-46; see Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-06 (1979). 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1524, 422 N.E.2d at 1339. 
' /d. While the hearing before the master was in progress, Ms. Parekh reconveyed the prop-
erty to Antioch Temple. Judgment dismissing the case against her was entered. /d. 
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commenced, Ivory Miles intervened. • Miles contended that he, and not 
Tompkins, was the true pastor and president of Antioch and, therefore, he 
had the right to use and control the disputed property. 9 Miles and Tompkins 
agreed to have the master adjudicate this dispute in order to avoid addi-
tional litigation. '0 
The pertinent facts found by the master were as follows: In 1962 Antioch 
was incorporated pursuant to chapter 180 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws for the purpose of promulgating the apostolic faith. 11 By-laws were 
enacted and a board of directors was selected. 12 Responsibility for manag-
ing Antioch, including the power to appoint and remove the pastor, lay with 
the board. 13 
In 1963, Antioch purchased property in Cambridge (the property) to be 
used for meetings and services. 14 Also in 1963, the board appointed Tomp-
kins pastor!' Tompkins resigned from this position in 1966!6 He was 
replaced by Miles, who earlier in the year had been named assistant 
pastor.'' Shortly after his appointment, Miles moved his family into the 
property and continued to occupy the premises throughout the instant pro-
ceeding.11 
Prior to 1966, Tompkins, Miles and Antioch all belonged to the 
Pentecostal Church of the Apostolic Faith Association, Inc. (PCAF}, an 
organization existing under the laws of Michigan, and established to pro-
mote the tenets of the apostolic faith. 19 Membership in PCAF was not a 
condition precedent to practicing the apostolic faith. 20 Members could 
dissolve their affiliation with PCAF for any reason at any time and incur no 
penalty upon so doing. 21 PCAF had no supervisory powers over its 
members and it had no established tribunal for resolving disputes between 
its members. 22 
I /d . 
• /d. 
10 ld. 
" /d. at 1524-25, 422 N.E.2d at 1339. Section three of chapter 180 of the Massachusetts 
General Laws provides in part that a "[a) corporation may be formed for ... (a) ... any ... 
religious purpose." 
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In 1968 friction developed between Miles and the board over responsibili-
ty for controlling and operating Antioch. 23 Miles, stating that he was "An-
tioch Temple,'' claimed all other church members were subservient to 
him. 24 In March, the board convened and voted to remove Miles as pastor, 
to request him to vacate the premises and to resign its affiliation with 
PCAF. 2' Shortly thereafter PCAF was so informed. 26 Miles refused to 
vacate. 27 Indeed, he disrupted meetings held at the property to such an ex-
tent that it became necessary to locate temporary quarters elsewhere in 
order to conduct church business. 21 On advice of counsel, the board also 
authorized conveyance of the property to a straw in order to safeguard the 
Temple's title to the property from any possible claims by Miles. 29 On other 
occasions Miles was again requested to vacate. so Each time he refused. 31 
In May of 1971, and 1976, Tompkins was elected to five year terms as 
president and pastor of Antioch. 32 In 1971, both Tompkins and Miles, as in-
dividuals, submitted their dispute to PCAF. 33 A board comprised of PCAF 
bishops ruled in Miles' favor. 34 Tompkins refused to recognize the ruling 
and shortly thereafter resigned from PCAF. 35 To these findings Miles flled 
no objection. 36 
The master's findings were adopted and confirmed by the superior 
court. 37 The judge concluded that Tompkins was the president and pastor 
of Antioch and therefore was entitled to conduct services at the Temple. 31 
He further ruled that Miles had no right to occupy the property and ordered 
him to vacate. 39 
" /d. 
24 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1526 n.3, 422 N.E.2d at 1340 n.3. 








" Id. The opinion describes Miles and Tompkins as submitting "a" dispute. ld. Whether 
that dispute concerned use of the property in question and the identity of the true pastor of An-
tioch, or some other issue, is not clear. 
•• /d. at 1527, 422 N.E~2d at 1340. The bishops also stated that Tompkins ''agreed to lay no 
further claims to Antioch Temple." /d. It is not clear whether, in fact, Tompkins did so agree. 
" /d. 
" Id. Rule S3(e)(2) of the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may 
me written objections to a master's findings and that such objections shall "clearly state the 
grounds for each objection." In addition, those fmdings are binding "unless clearly 
erroneous." ld. 
37 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1527, 422 N.E.2d at 1340 . 
.. /d . 
.. ld. 
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As noted by the Supreme Judicial Court, the first amendment to the 
United States Constitution does not altogether bar civil courts from ad-
judicating church property disputes. 40 Indeed, the United States Supreme 
Court has recognized that states have an obvious interest in providing a 
forum whereby churches and their members can seek a practical and con-
clusive resolution to their property claims. 41 Nevertheless, because the 
danger is real that the state may become emeshed in an essentially religious 
controversy, or, perhaps even effectively become the champion of a 
religious cause, the first amendment severely circumscribes the civil court's 
role in adjudicating religious property disputes. 42 If a civil court does exer-
cise jurisdiction in such a case, the first amendment mandates that the deci-
sion not be founded on dogma or religious practice. 43 
An issue sometimes discussed in church property controversies, and ac-
corded considerable weight in the instant case, was the fact question of 
whether the church structure was congregational or hierarchical. 44 
Although neither conclusion is outcome determinative, as stated in An-
tioch, in controversies "involving hierarchical churches . . . civil courts 
must tread more cautiously."45 This is in recognition of the fact that such 
churches often have formal procedures and tribunals for resolving internal 
controversies. 46 This is not to suggest, however, that in property disputes 
•• Id. at 1528-29,422 N.E.2d at 1341 (citing Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 449 (1969)). 
•• Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) . 
., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1528, 422 N.E.2d at 1341 (citing Presbyterian Church v. Hull 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)). See also Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 
u.s. 696, 698 (1976) . 
., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1528,422 N.E.2d at 1341 (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,602 
(1979) and Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976)). 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1529, 422 N.E.2d at 1341. Wheeler v. Roman Catholic Arch-
diocese of Boston, 378 Mass. 58, 62 n.2, 389 N.E.2d 966, 968 n.2 (1979) states: 
There are at least three kinds of internal church structures, or polity, which may be 
discerned; congregational, presbyterial, and episcopal. In the congregational form, 
each local congregation is self-governing. The presbyterial polities are representative, 
authority being exercised by laymen and ministers organized in an ascending succession 
of judicatories-prebystery over the session of the local church, synod over presbytery, 
and general assembly over all. In the episcopal form power reposes in clerical superiors, 
such as bishops. Roughly presbyterial and episcopal polities may be considered hierar-
chical, as opposed to congregational polities, in which the autonomy of the local 
congregation is the central principle. Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the 
Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1142, 1143-44 (1962). Accordingly, whether 
or not a given church is hierarchical is a question of fact. See Kelley v. Riverside 
Boulevard Independent Church of God, 44 Ill. App. 3d 673 (1976); State ex rei. Morrow 
v. Hill, 51 Ohio St. 2d 74 (1977) . 
., 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1530, 422 N.E.2d at 1342 (citing Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. 
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976)). 
•• /d. see Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976). 
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civil courts always must accept as final, decisions from such judicatories. 
Indeed in Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court made it clear that state courts 
would not be so bound. 47 In any event, as noted by the Supreme Judicial 
Court, decisions of the authorized body of a Congregational church regard-
ing property or related matters may be affirmed by civil courts. 41 Here, the 
master made no explicit finding regarding Antioch's structure. 49 Never-
theless, his general findings indicated, and the Supreme Judicial Court con-
cluded, that Antioch was as Congregational church. 50 Because the master 
determined that the board was the duly authorized decision making body of 
the church, and because the board had removed Miles and elected Tomp-
kins as pastor and president, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower 
court's judgment ordering Miles' removal from the property and declaring 
Tompkins to be Antioch's pastor and president. 51 
The Court submitted that even if Antioch were a hierarchical church, the 
result would be the same. 52 Although PCAF did not have a formal dispute 
resolution tribunal, 53 and, although Wheeler v. Archdiocese of Boston 54 left 
open the question of whether a civil court properly could exercise jurisdic-
tion in a church property dispute involving a hierarchical church having no 
formal judicatory, 55 the Court emphasized that Wheeler was decided short-
ly before Jones v. Wolf. 56 In Jones, the Supreme Court made it clear that a 
state court was not necessarily bound by a hierarchical church's decision in 
such a property dispute case. 57 The Supreme Court emphasized that in ad-
judicating such controversies, a state can apply any one of several methods 
41 443 u.s. 595, 602 (1979). 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1529, 422 N.E.2d at 1341-42 (citing Maryland & Virginia Elder-
ship of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970)). 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1532, 422 N.E.2d at 1343. 
•• Jd: By incorporating under chapter 180 of the Massachusetts General Laws, Antioch was 
not considered a subdivision of any other entity. Antioch's own by-laws empowered its board 
of directors to manage and control its affairs as well as to appoint and remove its officers or 
employees. In addition, nothing in the PCAF constitution established PCAF's dominance over 
member churches. Indeed, at a meeting in June, 1966, the issue of PCAF's authority over Anti-
och was discussed. The attorney who had organized Antioch explained to the board of direc-
tors and officers that pursuant to Massachusetts law, and Antioch's by-laws, the board, and 
not PCAF, had the authority to remove employees. A bishop from PCAF also present at that 
meeting, apparently disagreed with the attorney. Id. at 1525-26, 422 N.E.2d at 133940. 
" Id. at 1535, 422 N.E.2d at 134445. 
52 Id. at 1535-37, 422 N.E.2d at 1345. 
" Id. at 1535, 422 N.E.2d at 1345. 
•• 378 Mass. 58, 389 N.E.2d 966 (1979). 
" Id. at 62 n.3, 389 N.E.2d at 968 n.3. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1535, 422 N.E.2d at 1345. Jones was decided on July 2, 1979. 
Wlreemr was decided on May 10, 1979. 
" 443 U.S. at 602 (citing Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25 
(1976)). 
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"so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the 
ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith."" Specifically approved 
in Jones, ' 9 and acknowledged in Antioch, 60 was the "neutral principles of 
laws" method. 61 If that method were applied here, the Court would analyze 
the pertinent sections of chapter 180 of the Massachusetts General Laws, 
the constitutions and by-laws of P ACF and Antioch as they relate to owner-
ship, control and use of property and the deed to the property itself. 62 
Moreover, as stated by the Chief Justice "even were we to hold that An-
tioch is part of a hierarchical church whose highest tribunal ruled on the 
dispute (by granting Miles the control and use of the ... property), the First 
Amendment would not command us to accept that ruling. " 63 
" 443 U.S. at 602 (quoting Maryland & Virginia Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 
367. 368 (1970)). 
" 443 U.S. at 603. 
60 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1535-37, 422 N.E.2d at 1345. 
" The neutral principles of law method was first alluded to in a decision authored by Justice 
Brennan when he remarked that "there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all 
property disputes, which can be applied without establishing churches to which property is 
awarded." Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). See also Maryland 
& Virginia Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368-70 (1970). In describing this 
method in Jones v. Wolf, Mr. Justice Blackman stated: 
The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it is completely sec-
ular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organi-
zation and polity. The method relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts 
of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free civil 
courts completely from entaglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and prac-
tice. Furthermore, the neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-
law systems in general-Flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect 
the intentions of the parties. Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provi-
sions religious societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the event of 
a particular contingency, or what religious body will determine the ownership in the 
event of a schism or doctrinal controversy. In this manner, a religious organization can 
ensure that a dispute over the ownership of church property will be resolved in accord 
with the desires of the members. 
443 U.S. at 603-04. 
62 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1537,422 N.E.2d at 1346. As noted by the Court, pursuant to sec-
tion six of chapter 180 of the Massachusetts General Laws, Antioch was entitled to hold and 
convey property proVided the property was used for the religious purposes set out in the articles 
of organization. Pursuant to Antioch's by-laws, its board of directors was responsible for 
operating the church. Nothing in PCAF's articles of organization indicated that property held 
by a church which later repudiated its membership would revert to PCAF. No eVidence was ad-
duced which suggested that legal title to the property was in anyone other than Antioch, ld. 
" Id. As mentioned in supra note 3, the dispute perhaps goes beyond mere ownership and 
control of property. Miles, Tompkins and Antioch also were at odds as to who was the true 
pastor and president. The master found that it was Tompkins./d. at 1527,422 N.E.2d at 1340. 
This finding was adopted and confirmed by the Superior Court. Apparently, however, in 1972, 
when both Miles and Tompkins submitted "a" dispute to PCAF, PCAF ruled that Miles was 
Antioch's pastor and president./d. If this is an ecclesiastical question, and if PCAF is a hier-
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§ 11.3. PoHdcal Rights-Independent Candidates. In Bachrach v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1 a case raising an issue never before de-
cided, the Court concluded that legislation affecting Independent can-
didates for political office by regulating the use of political designations on 
the ballot and on nomination papers violated provisions of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the United States Constitution. 2 
The instant legislation was enacted in 1979.3 Prior to its enactment, can-
didates, not nominated by a political party, 4 and seeking office such as state 
senator, could choose, with some limitations, a desired political designation 
to appear on his or her nomination papers and on the ballot.' The designa-
tion could not exceed three words and no one word could refer to an ex-
isting political party. 6 Obviously then, under prior law, candidates wishing 
to designate themselves as Independents could do so. Chapter 745 of the 
1979 Acts and Resolves changed this. 7 The word "Independent" was pro-
archical church, and, if, in fact, this question was decided at the 1972 meeting, its resolution 
would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts' courts. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 
595, 602 {1979). Indeed, the facts in Jones are remarkably similar. Each of the two rival fac-
tions of a church, which was part of a hierarchical structure, claimed to be the true represent-
ative of the local church and thereby entitled to use and enjoy the church property. /d. at 598. 
The hierarchical tribunal ruled in favor of the minority group. /d. The state court ruled in 
favor of the majority without indicating the reasons for its ruling. Id. at 599. The minority 
claimed this issue was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. /d. at 607. In remanding the case to 
the state court for further consideration on this issue, the Supreme Court noted the possible 
validity of the minority's claim. /d. at 608-10. If the state court reached its decision pursuant to 
a purely secular rule such as a presumption of majority rule, then its decision would stand. /d. 
If, however, its decision required it to examine religious doctrine, polity or practice then its rul-
ing would be without force. /d. at 607-610. 
§ 12.3. ' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 93, 415 N.E.2d 832. 
2 Id. at 93-103, 415 N.E.2d at 837-39. Rights guaranteed under the first and fourteenth 
amendments to the United States Constitution, and articles 1 and 16 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights were implicated. /d. For the text of these provisions see infra note 32. 
' 1979 Mass. Acts c. 745. The Court focused primarily on sections 2 and 7 of chapter 745. 
These sections amended G.L. c. 53,§ 8 and G.L. c. 54,§ 41. See infra note 7. 
• Political Party is defined in G.L. c. SO,§ 1 as an organization whose candidate for Gover-
nor received at least 3 percent of the vote for that office in the previous statewide election and 
which has not been adjudicated subversive under G.L. c. 264, § 18. 
' G.L. c. 53, § 8 describes the information permitted to be printed on nomination papers. 
Prior to 1979, the word "Independent" was permitted. G.L. c. 54,§ 41 provides for the infor-
mation contained on the ballot. Again, prior law permitted the designation "Independent." 
' G.L. c. 53, § 8. 
' Section 2 of chapter 745 amended G.L. c. 53, § 8 in pertinent part as follows: 
All certificates of nomination and nomination papers shall, specify as to each, {l) his 
residence, with street and number, if any, {2) the office for which he is nominated, and 
{3) except as otherwise provided in this section and except for city and town elections 
which are not preceded by primaries or political party caucuses, the political designa-
tion, if any, which he represents, expressed in not more than three words; provided, 
however, that the designation "Independent" shall not be used. 
18
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hibited from appearing on both the nomination papers and the ballot.• 
Moreover, if a candidate failed to indicate a permissible designation, the 
word "Unenrolled" would be placed on the ballot. 9 · 
George Bachrach, a one time Democrat who no longer sympathized with 
that party's philosophies or ideologies, initiated this action in the Supreme 
Judicial Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. 10 A single justice 
granted Bachrach's motion for summary judgment and then reported the 
case to the full court!• During his 1980 campaign for the state senate, Mr. 
Bachrach described himself as an Independent/Democrat or simply as an 
Independent. The Secretary of State's Office informed him that this 
description was impermissible and that if he failed to choose an appropriate 
designation, the word "Unenrolled" would appear on the ballot. 12 
The Court noted that the Commonwealth has some discretion regarding 
the nature and the scope of information contained on the ballot. 13 Indeed, 
Justice Kaplan, writing for the majority, indicated that a state perhaps 
could place no information at all on the ballot regarding political affilia-
tion. 14 Rather, responsibility for educating the electorate on that issue 
possibly could be left to the candidate and to the people themselves. 15 Here, 
of course, the legislation was struck down. Although the Court could not 
find any case precisely on point, it cited several decisions involving similar 
facts. 16 In each case the reviewing court had applied a rigorous standard of 
Section 7 of chapter 745 amended G.L. c. 54,§ 41, in pertinent part, as follows: 
To the name of each candidate for a state or city office, except for city elections, which 
are not preceded by primaries, shall be added in the same space his party or political 
designation; provided, however, that the designation shall not include the term "In-
dependent". Failure to make a political designation shall result in the term "Unenroll-
ed'' being used. 
' 1979 Mass. Acts. c. 745. 
' 1979 Mass. Acts c. 745, § 2 (amending G.L. c. 54, § 41). 
10 /d. at 93, 415 N.E.2d at 832. G.L. c. 231A, § 1 authorizes the Supreme Judicial Court to 
issue declaratory judgments. General equity jurisdiction is conferred on the Court pursuant to 
chapter 214, section 1. 
11 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 93, 415 N.E.2d at 833. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 95-96, 415 N.E.2d at 834. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 98, 415 N.E.2d at 835 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. 
819, 821, 333 N.E.2d 380, 382 (1975)). 
14 /d. 
" /d.; see Libertarian Party of California v. Eu, 102 Cal. App.3d 446,455, 162 Cal. Rptr. 
381, 386 (1980). 
" In Libertarian Party of California v. Eu, 102 Cal. App.3d 446, 162 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1980), 
the court of appeal held unconstitutional a statute which, in certain instances, mandated that 
the word "Independent" appear on the ballot opposite an candidate's name instead of that 
candidate's desired political designation. If a candidate qualified to be placed on the ballot via 
participation in a statewide primary, then the name of that candidate's political party would 
appear on the ballot. If, however, the candidate qualified by virtue of the state's petitions pro-
cedure, then the word "Independent" would appear. The court concluded that this statutory 
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review.' 7 The Supreme Judicial Court agreed that since the legislation af-
fected constitutional rights, strict scrutiny was appropriate. 11 The state 
argued that the legislation was designed to achieve a compelling interest, to 
wit, prevention of voter confusion as to candidates' true political beliefs. 19 
The parties, in fact, had stipulated that the designation "Independent" did 
classification impaired the exercise of the fundamental rights of freedom of association and 
equal participation in the electoral process and thereby violated the guarantee of equal protec-
tion. /d. at 457-58, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88. 
In Minnesota Fifth Cong. Dist. Independent-Republican Party v. Minn. ex rei. Spannaus, 
295 N.W.2d 650 (Minn. 1980), a law requiring Independent candidates to execute an affidavit 
stating that he or she did not seek, and would not seek or accept, any political party's support 
in the forthcoming election was struck down as violating the first amendment rights of freedom 
of expression and association. /d. at 655. 
Ridell v. National Democratic Party, 508 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1975) considered the constitu-
tionality of a Mississippi law granting the exclusive right to use the name of a political party to 
the group who first registered the name. A dispute arose between two rival factions of the 
Democratic Party; each claiming to be the true representatives of that party. The lower court 
ruled that the faction first registering the name "Democratic" had the right to use that descrip-
tion. The court of appeals concluded that the statute impermissibly interfered with freedom of 
association and therefore violated the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. /d. at 779. 
17 The courts in all three decisions referred to in supra note 16, concluded that the statutes in 
question touched upon fundamental rights and therefore applied strict scrutiny. In Libertarian 
Party of Calfornia v. Eu, 102 Cal. App.3d at 456, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 386, the court agreed that 
regulating the number of candidates on the ballot was a compelling interest. Nevertheless, the 
court refused to accept the state's assertion that this, in fact, was the purpose of the st~~ttute. 
The court next suggested that the state's interests in preventing a candidate from misrepresent-
ing his or her status as a nominee of non-qualified parties, and "maintaining the stability of its 
political system by preventing unrestrained proliferation of parties", could be compelling. 
However, because the instant statute was not the least restrictive means of achieving these in-
terests, the court refused to uphold it./d. at 458, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 387. 
In Minnesota Fifth Cong. Dist. Independent Republican Party v. Minn. ex rei. Spannaus, 
295 N.W.2d at 635, the court accepted the state's interest in ensuring the bona fides of a can-
didate's claim to be "Independent" as compelling. The court concluded that this was not the 
actual purpose of the law, and that, in any event, there would be other, less drastic methods of 
achieving that goal. /d. at 654. 
Preventing voter confusion was the asserted state interest in Riddell v. National Democratic 
Party, 508 F.2d at 777. The court is unclear as to whether that interest was compelling. Even if 
it were, however, it would not have survived the rigors of strict scrutiny since the court did con-
clude that the legislation was not the least restrictive means of realizing that end. /d. at 778. 
11 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 101, 415 N.E.2d at 836. Although the Court agreed that strict 
scrunity was appropriate, seemingly, that formulation is not as rigidly applied by the Supreme 
Judicial Court as it is by the United States Supreme Court.Id. at 101 n.18, 415 N.E.2d at 837 
n.18. See Marcoux v. Attorney General, 375 Mass. 63,65 n.4, 375 N.E.2d 688,689 n.4 (1978). 
See also Moe v. Secretary of Administration and Finance, 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 48, 49, 417 
N.E.2d 387, 388 (1981). For a discussion regarding the Supreme Judicial Court's perspective 
on strict scrutiny see supra note 76, § 2.1, and accompanying text. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 102, 415 N.E.2d at 837. 
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not evoke a consistent or clear meaning in voters' minds. 20 Apparently some 
people associated the label with generally conservative ideas while others 
believed it denoted generally liberal views. However, the parties also had 
stipulated that the description "Citizens Party," which was to appear on 
the November 1980 ballot, likewise generated no consistent meaning. 21 
Thus, although the Court was willing to assume arguendo that prevention 
of voter confusion perhaps could constitute a compelling interest, that, in 
fact, was not the true purpose of this legislation. The state also contended 
that the instant provisions were intended to prevent Independents from 
realizing an unfair advantage over other candidates. 22 Again, the parties 
had stipulated that the description "Independent," although perhaps 
creating inconsistent ideas in voters' minds, did generate an overall 
favorable impression. 23 This objective, like prevention of confusion, was re-
jected as not representing the real purpose of the statute. 24 Indeed, Justice 
Kaplan suggested that the provision well may have been intended to further 
insulate the reigning political parties from criticism. 25 Even if preventing 
unfair advantage were compelling, an assumption incidentally not made by 
the Court, it, like prevention of confusion, would have failed the means 
portion of the strict scrutiny formulation. 26 Although not expressly stated 
by the Court, other less restrictive methods could have been used to achieve 
that statutory purpose. 27 
Viewed most simply, the legislation, in effect, prevented all candidates 
from formally using the word "Independent". According to the Court, this 
was analogous to a state prohibiting a candidate from discussing a par-
ticular topic during a campaign. 28 Thus, the Court concluded, the legisla-
20 Id. at 96-97, 415 N.E.2d at 834. 
21 Id. at 97, 415 N.E.2d at 834. Also to appear on the ballot were the designations "Against 
Politician's Raise" and "The Anderson Coalition". /d. 
22 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 102, 415 N.E.2d at 836. 
2
' /d. at 97,415 N.E.2d at 834. The Court also noted that the term ''Unenrolled'' well might 
cause a negative reaction with voters. Id. 
24 /d. at 102-103, 415 N.E.2d at 837 . 
., /d. at 106, 415 N.E.2d at 839 (citing Cox, The Supreme Court 1979 Term Forward: 
Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1, 67 (1980)). 
20 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 103, 415 N.E.2d at 836. 
27 /d. The Commonwealth seemed to concede that other permitted designations were as con-
fusing as "Independent". /d. Nevertheless, it asserted, because the legislation was designed to 
deal with the issue of voter confusion, the legislature should be permitted to proceed one step 
at a time in addressing that problem. /d. at 103, 415 N.E.2d at 837. This argument was rejected 
because, as noted by the Court, the legislation touched on fundamental rights. Id. at 102~3, 
415 N.E.2d at 836-37. However, the Supreme Court has often stated that when a nonfun-
damental right is infringed and hence, the normal rational basis standard of review is applied, 
the legislation need not be precisely tailored. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 
u.s. 483 (1955). 
21 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 99,415 N.E.2d at 836; cf: Consolidated Edison Co. of New York 
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tion impaired freedom of expression. 29 In addition, the provisions impaired 
the ability of candidates, and their supporters, to organize and associate for 
political purposes, thereby burdening freedom of association. 30 This legisla-
tion was particulary egregious, as noted by the Court, because not only did 
it curtail the exercise of constitutional rights, but also, it did so in a 
discriminatory fashion. 31 The Commonwealth generally allowed candidates 
to select their desired political designation. Only those candidates wishing to 
identify themselves as Independents were singled out for special treatment. 
Thus, the Court concluded the provisions violated the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution as well as Articles 1 and 16 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. 32 
§ 12.4. Seizure of the MBTA-Separadon of Powers/Inherent Authority 
of the Governor. In Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Advisory 
Board v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority,' the Court con-
sidered the legality of Governor Edward King's seizure of the MBT A in 
November 1980. 
v. Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 537-40 (1980) (public service commis-
sion's prohibition against utility companies' insertion of controversial information with 
monthly bill violated first amendment). 
20 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 99-100, 415 N.E.2d at 836. 
•• Id. at 100-101, 415 N.E.2d at 836. 
" /d. at 101, 415 N.E.2d at 386. 
" Id. at 93-103, 415 N.E.2d at 837-39. Article 1 of the Massachusetts Constitution provides: 
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable 
rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives 
and liberties; that of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of seek-
ing and obtaining their safety and happiness. Equality under the law shall not be denied 
or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin. 
Article 16 of the Massachusetts Constitution provides: 
The liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state: it ought not, 
therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth. The right of free speech shall not be 
abridged. 
The Court never decided whether Article 9 of the Massachusetts Constitution also was 
violated. Id. at 99 n.12~ 415 N.E.2d at 835 n.12. Article 9 provides that ''All elections ought to 
be free; and all the inhabitants of this commonwealth, having such qualifications as they shall 
establish by their frame of government, have an equal right to elect officers, and to be elected, 
for public employments." The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides in pertinent part: "[N)or shall any state ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws." The Court expressed no opinion as to whether chapter 745 also 
violated due process. However, because the Court concluded that it impaired rights protected 
by the flrst amendment, and because the flrst amendment is incorporated into the fourteenth 
amendment, presumably the legislation violated the constitutional guarantee of due process. 
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
§ 12.4. 1 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 403, 417 N.E.2d 7. 
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The MBTA Advisory Board2 authorized a budget for the MBTA's 1980 
operating year for an amount slighty in excess of $302,130,000. 3 However, 
in August of 1980 it became apparent that operating costs would exceed that 
amount and, therefore, the Board of Directors' of the MBT A requested 
that the Advisory Board approve a supplemental budget approaching 
$41,000,000.' This request was denied. 6 On October 31, 1980, the Advisory 
Board initiated the instant proceeding seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief designed to prevent the MBT A from expending beyond its initially 
authorized ·budget. 7 On November 10, 1980, a superior court judge issued a 
2 G.L. c. 161A, § 7 provides in part: 
There shall be an advisory board to the authority consisting of the city manager in the 
case of a Plan D or E city or the mayor of each other city, and the chairman of the 
board of selectmen of each town, constituting the authority. Each mayor or city man-
ager and each chairman may, by writing filed with the authority, from time to time ap-
point a designee to act for him on the advisory board or to act for him in exercising the 
powers of the sixty-four cities and towns or of the fourteen cities and towns under sec-
tion six. Each city and each town shall have one vote on the advisory board plus addi-
tional votes and fractions thereof determined by multiplying one and one half times the 
total number of cities and towns in the authority by a fraction of which the numerator 
shall be the total amount of all assessments made by the state treasurer to such city or 
town under this chapter and the denominator shall be the total amount of all assess-
ments made by the state treasurer to all such cities and towns. 
' G.L. c. 161A, § 5(i) provides in pertinent part: 
(i) All current expenses of the authority shall be in accordance with an itemized budget. 
The authority, in consultation with the secretary and the advisory board, shall prepare 
said budget and shall submit it to the secretary and the advisory board not later than Oc-
tober first of each year for the ensuing calendar year. The secretary shall review and 
· make recommendations regarding said budget within thirty days after submission. 
Within ninety days after such submission, the advisory board shall approve said budget 
as submitted or subject it to such itemized reductions therein as the advisory board shall 
deem appropriate. The budget shall govern the current expenses of the authority during 
such calendar year. No such expenses may be incurred in excess of those shown in the 
budget, but the budget may from time to time be amended by the preparation and sub-
mission by the authority to the advisory board and the secretary of supplements thereto. 
The secretary shall review and make recommendations regarding said supplementary 
budget within fifteen days after its submission. The advisory board shall within thirty 
days after submission to it approve or reduce any such supplementary budget as pro-
vided above. 
• G.L. c. 161A § 6 provides in part: 
The authority shall be managed by a board of seven directors, called the directors, one 
of whom shall be the secretary, who shall be the chairman and shall not be compensated 
therefor, six of whom shall be appointed by the governor and who shall serve coter-
minous with the governor, one with the approval of the advisory board, one with the 
approval of the fourteen cities and towns, and one with the approval of the sixty-four 
cities and towns. 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 406, 417 N.E.2d at 10. 
• /d. at 406-07, 417 N.E.2d at 10. 
' /d. at 404, 417 N.E.2d at 9. 
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preliminary injunction enjoining certain of the then named defendants from 
certifying, charging, authorizing or expending any amount beyond the 
originally approved budget.• On November 16, 1980, the Advisory Board 
convened but again refused to authorize any additional expenditures.' The 
following day, November 17, the legislature convened in special session but 
failed to take any action. 10 On November 18, Governor King issued Ex-
ecutive Order 189 declaring the existence of an emergency and seizing con-
The annual deficit of the MBTA, referred to as the net cost of service, is defined in G.L. c. 
161A, § 1 as, in essence, the difference between income from sources including operations and 
state and federal assistance and expenses not constituting capitalized expenditures. As pro-
vided in section 12 of chapter 161A, the MBTA certifies the net cost of service to the Treasurer 
and Receiver General. The seventy-nine cities and towns within the MBTA district are then as-
sessed, pursuant to formulas set out in sections 8-11, their allocable share of the net cost of 
service. The superior court judge indicated that it was highly unlikely that the cities and towns 
improperly assessed for costs incurred under Executive Order 189 could recover those costs. 
1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 407, 417 N.E.2d at 10. 
In Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority Advisory Board v. The Governor, 1981 
Mass. Adv. Sh. S49, 417 N.E.2d 419, the Advisory Board, as well as certain cities and towns 
within the MBTA district, sought to prevent assessment of nearly $12,000,000 in costs incurred 
under Executive Order 172. The facts giving rise to that order were similar to those involving 
Executive Order 189. In July 1979, the Advisory Board approved a supplemental budget of ap-
proximately $11,000,000. However, it stated that no further increases would be forthcoming 
and no cuts in service would be permitted. By mid-December 1979 operating costs reached the 
bucfiet ceiling. The Board of Directors of the MBT A thereupon voted to shut down the system 
on December 18. On that same day Governor King issued Executive Order 172 calling fd'r the 
continued operation of the MBT A for the remainder of the year. The Supreme Judicial Court 
noted that Executive Order 172 was beyond the powers of the Governor and therefore of no 
force or effect. The Court acknowledged that "[f]or purposes of the present case we accept the 
plaintiffs' contention that, in the absence of legislative- action, the expenditures of nearly 
$12 million pursuant to Executive Order 172 was not part of the net cost of service to be as-
sessed to the cities and towns in the MBTA district .... " /d. at SS2, 417 N.E.2d at 421. Never-
theless, the Court refused to enjoin assessment because in 1980 the legislature appropriated ad-
ditional funds to reduce the 1979 net cost of service. The Court concluded that the practical ef-
fect of the legislative action was a ratification of Executive Order 172. /d. at SS3-S4, 417 
N.E.2d at 422. 
• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at404-0S, 417 N.E.2d at 9. The original defendants were the MBTA, 
its Board of Directors and Controller, Barry Locke and the Treasurer and Receiver General of 
the Commonwealth. The injunction prohibited the defendants, other than the Treasurer and 
Receiver General, against whom the injunction was not directed, from "(1) certifying or 
charging to the Treasurer and Receiver General any sums attributable to the MBT A net cost of 
service which derived from expenditures in excess of $302,130,1S2, and (2) expending or 
authorizina expenditures attributable to MBTA operations during the calendar year 1980 in ex-
cess of $302,130,1S2." Id. at 40S, 417 N.E.2d at 9. Part 2 of the injunction was stayed until 
November 30, 1980. 
• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 40S, 417 N.E.2d at 9. 
"ld. 
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trol of MBT A operations. 11 The Advisory Board promptly amended its 
complaint and named Governor King as an additional defendant. 12 
The Governor claimed both statutory and constitutional authority in sup-
port of the takeover. 13 Citing chapter 161A, § 20 as his principal source of 
statutory authority the Governor noted that he is empowered to take con-
trol of the MBT A in certain emergency situations. 14 However, as indicated 
by the Court, that provision applies only when a slowdown, interruption or 
stoppage of service occurs after the issuance of, and in violation of, an 
11 Id. at 404, 417 N.E.2d at 9. Pursuant to that Order, authority for running the system was 
placed with the Board of Directors. Pursuant to G.L. c. 161A, § 6 the MBTA is managed by 
the seven members of its Board of Directors. 
12 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 405, 417 N.E.2d at 9. The Governor claimed that neither injunc-
tive nor declaratory relief was appropriate. With regard to injunctive relief he cited Rice v. 
Governor, 207 Mass. 577, 579, 93 N.E. 821, 823 (1911) for the proposition that mandamus is 
inapplicable against the Governor with respect to performance of his official duties. The 
Supreme Judicial Court noted that injunctive relief had not been granted with respect to Ex-
ecutive Order 189. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 408, 417 N .E.2d at 11. The Governor also indicated 
that G.L. c. 231A, § 2 which concerns controversies to which declaratory relief is applicable, 
provides that "this section shall not apply to the governor .... " The Court pointed out that, 
consistent with chapter 231A, § 2, declaratory relief may be denied if such relief "would not 
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceedings." 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 408, 417 N.E.2d at 11. After concluding that the lower court's "preliminary declaration" 
was inappropriate, the Court stated that it would treat the plaintiffs' request for declaratory 
relief as a motion for partial summary judgment. /d. at 409, 417 N.E.2d at 11. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 410-13, 417 N.E.2d at 12-13. 
14 /d. at 410-12, 417 N.E.2d at 12-13. G.L. c. 161A, § 20 provides: 
Notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, whenever there exists a continued inter-
ruption, stoppage or slowdown of transportation of passengers on any vehicle or line of -
the authority or a strike causing the same, and which is in violation of an injunction, a 
temporary injunction, a restraining order, or other order of a court of competent 
jurisdiction, and which threatens the availability of essential services of transportation 
to such an extent as to endanger the health, safety or welfare of the community, the 
governor may declare that an emergency exists. During such emergency he may take 
possession of, and operate in whole or in part, the lines and facilities of the authority in 
order to safeguard the public health, safety and welfare. Such power and authority may 
be exercised through any department or agency of the commonwealth or through any 
person or persons and with the assistance of such public or private instrumentalities as 
may be designated by him. Such lines and facilities shall be operated for the account of 
the authority. The powers hereby granted to the governor shall expire forty-five days 
after his proclamation that state of emergency exists. 
As an additional source of statutory authority, the Governor cited chapter 639 of the 1950 
Acts and Resolves, as amended by chapter 425, § 1 of the 1958 Acts and Resolves. /d. at 412, 
417 N.E.2d at 13. This legislation, often referred to as the civil defense statute, is entitled "[a]n 
Act authorizing the governor to deal with the threat of danger by drought." It provides, in per-
tinent part, that "whenever because of absence of rainfall or other cause a condition exists in 
all or any part of the commonwealth where it may reasonably be anticipated that the health, 
safety or property of the citizens thereof will be endangered because of fire or shortage of 
food" the Governor may declare an emergency. The Court quickly concluded that a fmancial 
dispute did not constitute "[an]other cause." /d. 
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existing court order. 1' Because the present case involved no such order, that 
statute was inapplicable. 
The Governor further contended that, as the Commonwealth's chief ex-
ecutive, he possessed inherent authority for dealing with emergencies such 
as an imminent MBT A shutdown. 16 The Court acknowledged that although 
the Governor indeed has incidental powers necessary to discharge his prin-
cipal constitutional role of "chief executive magistrate," 17 here he exceeded 
those powers11 and, in so doing, violated the principle of separation of 
powers. Pursuant to chapter 161A, § S(i), "[a]ll current expenses of the 
authority shall be in accordance with an itemized budget . . . . The budget 
shall govern the current expenses of the authority during such calendar 
year. No such expenses may be incurred in excess of those shown in the 
budget." u Moreover, article 20 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
clearly designates the legislature as the only branch having the power to sus-
pend execution of any law. 20 By authorizing an additional $41,000,000 to 
the MBTA's 1980 budget, not only did Governor King suspend chapter 
161A, § S(i), a clear violation of article 20, but also, in effect, he ap-
propriated funds, a function clearly relegated to the legislature. 21 
The Court acknowledged the difficult situation confronting the Gover-
nor. 22 The Advisory Board had refused to authorize a supplemental budget. 
The legislature had convened but failed to resolve the problem. A shutdown 
of service could well endanger the safety and welfare of the citizens of the 
" Id. 
" Id. 
" Id. MAss. CoNST., Part II, c. 2, § 1, Art. 1 provides that "[t]here shall be a supreme ex-
ecutive magistrate, who shall be styled, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 
and whose title shall be-His Excellency." 
The Executive is not the only branch possessing inherent powers. Both the legislature and the 
judiciary possess such power. See, e.g., Attorney General v. Brissenden, 271 Mass. 172, 177, 
171 N.E. 82, 86 (1930) (legislature); O'Coins, Inc. v. Treasurer, 362 Mass. 507, 409-10, 287 
N.E.2d 608, 611 (1972) (judiciary). 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 412, 417 N.E.2d at 13. MAss. CONST. Part I. Art. 30 provides: 
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise 
the executive and judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall never exercise 
the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the 
legislative and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of 
laws and not of men. 
" G.L. c. 161A, § S(i). 
20 MASS. CONST. Part I, Art. 20 provides: 
"The power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be ex-
ercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such 
particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for." 
21 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 375 Mass. 827, 833, 376 N.E.2d 1217, 1222 (1978); 
Baker v. Commonwealth, 312 Mass. 490, 493, 45 N.E.2d 470, 472 (1942); Opinion of the 
Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 614, 19 N.E.2d 807, 813 (1939). 
22 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 413, 417 N.E.2d at 13. 
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Commonwealth by causing traffic congestion and thereby impair access of 
fire, police and other emergency personnel. The Court finally concluded 
that the Governor could operate the MBTA until 12 p.m. December 5, 
1981, the date by which the majority of the Court felt the legislature 
reasonably could be expected to have convened. 23 
The Court did not clearly state the source of power permitting the Gover-
nor to operate the MBT A for that limited period. It is clear that the Gover-
nor could not authorize the additional $41,000,000, for that would result in 
an obvious violation of the principle of separation of powers. Yet the mere 
operation of the MBT A for the limited period would cause an expenditure 
of funds over the originally approved budget. Apparently the Court con-
cluded that the Governor had implied power to deal with the emergency un-
til the appropriate branch of government could convene and consider the 
problem. It is unfortunate that the Court did not explain this issue more 
clearly. 
§ 12.5. First Amendment - Public Access to Criminal Trials. In Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court• (Globe //), 2 a case on remand from the 
United States Supreme Court, 3 the Supreme Judicial Court considered 
whether Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 278, section 16A, 4 which 
mandates closing a trial during the testimony of a minor victim to a sex 
crime, violated the first amendment to the United States Constitution.' 
The instant case arose out of a case prosecuted in Norfolk County in 
which the defendant was charged with forcible rape and forced unnatural 
rape. 6 The three complaining female witnesses were minors. 7 The superior 
court judge ordered all preliminary hearings, as well as the trial itself, closed 
" Id. at 404, 413, 417 N.E.2d at 9, 14. 
§ 12.5. ' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1493, 423 N.E.2d 773. 
' The designation, Globe I, refers to the initial case on appeal to the Supreme Judicial 
Court. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 379 Mass. 846, 401 N.E.2d 360 (1980). Globe 
II refers to the instant case, i.e., the case on remand to the Supreme Judicial Court from the 
United States Supreme Court. See supra note 1. 
' 449 u.s. 890 (1982). 
• G.L. c. 278, § 16A provides in pertinent part: 
At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other crime in-
volving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the person upon, with or 
against whom the crime is alleged to have been committed ... the presiding justice shall 
exclude the general public from the courtroom, admitting only such persons as may 
have a direct interest in the case. 
' U.S. CoNST. amend. I provides in pertinent part that "Congress shall make no law ... 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to peaceably assem-
ble ... " 
• Commonwealth v. Aladjem, Norfolk Superior Court No. 73102-9. 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1494, 423 N.E.2d at 774. 
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to the public and press. • The Boston Globe ftled motions with the court re-
questing that the closure order be rescinded and that it (Globe) be allowed 
to intervene for the purpose of asserting its right of access.9 Relying on sec-
tion 16A, the court denied the Globe's motions. 10 Pursuant to 
Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 211, section 3,•• the Globe then 
sought injunctive relief from a single justice of the Supreme Judicial 
Court. 12 This was denied. 13 Thereupon the Globe appealed to the full court 
(Globe 1). 14 
Because the criminal trial had long since ended in acquittal by the time the 
case was decided on appeal, 15 the Court considered the case moot. 16 Never-
theless, since the issue was "significant and troublesome (yet] capable of 
repetition [but] evading review,"•' the Court proceeded to the merits. 
Although it eschewed any consideration of the constitutional questions 
raised by the Globe, 11 the Court did construe section 16A and concluded 
• /d. at 1494,423 N.E.2d at 774; 379 Mass. at 848,401 N.E.2d at 363. Court personnel were 
instructed not to permit anyone to enter the courtroom. In addition, a sign indicating that the 
room was closed was placed on the courtroom door. /d. at 848, 401 N.E.2d at 363. 
• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1494, 423 N.E.2d at 774. The Globe filed a motion to intervene, a 
motion for a hearing and a motion to revoke the order barring the press from attending the 
proceeding. 379 Mass. at 847, 401 N.E.2d at 362. 
10 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1494, 423 N.E.2d at 774. 
11 G.L. c. 211, § 3 provides in pertinent part: 
[t]he justices of the supreme judicial court shall also have general superintendence of the 
administration of all courts of inferior jurisdiction, including, without limitation, the 
prompt hearing and disposition of matters pending therein, ... and it may issue sueh 
writs, summonses and other processes and such orders, directions and rules as may be 
necessary or desirable for the furtherance of justice, the regular execution of the laws, 
the improvement of the administration of such courts, and the securing of their proper 
and efficient administration. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 149S, 423 N.E.2d at 774-7S. Specifically, the Globe requested "a 
temporary restraining order and permanent injunction ordering the judge to permit members 
of the press to attend the trial and related proceedings." 379 Mass. at 847, 401 N.E.2d at 362. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1494 n.2, 423 N.E.2d at 774 n.2. 
1• See supra note 2. 
" Judgment of acquittal was entered on May 7, 1979. Globe I was argued on October 9, 
1979 and decided on February 26, 1980. 
16 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 149S, 423 N.E.2d at 77S. 
" 379 Mass. at 848, 401 N.E.2d at 362 (quoting Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 
U.S. 498, SIS (1911)). 
11 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 149S, 423 N.E.2d at 77S. The Court refrained from considering 
the constitutional questions for several reasons. Although Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U.S. SSS (1980), already had been argued before the United States Supreme Court, a 
decision had not yet been rendered. 379 Mass. at 8S4, 401 N.E.2d at 366. In addition, the 
Supreme Judicial Court felt that the case could properly be disposed of on statutory grounds. 
/d. at 8S4, 401 N.E.2d at 366. Finally, the Court speculated that its decision, even though 
based on non-constitutional grounds, would closely approximate a decision grounded on the 
constitution. /d. at 8SS, 401 N.E.2d at 366. The Court so speculated because section 16A was 
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that closure was required only during that portion of the trial during which 
the minor victim testifies. 19 The Court went on to note, however, that the 
trial judge, in exercising discretion, and, after having accorded all affected 
parties an opportunity to be heard, may remove all persons, including the 
press, from any other portion of the trial. 20 
determined by the Court to be in derogation of the common law history of open criminal trials. 
A familiar rule of statutory construction provides that such statutes are to be strictly con-
strued. Id. at 853, 401 N.E.2d at 366 (citations ommitted). Therefore, since section 16A would 
be construed so as to favor publicity, the Court felt its conclusion would "minimize constitu-
tional doubts." Id. at 855, 401 N.E.2d at 366. 
The Globe, in Globe L claimed that it had a right of access under both the first amendment 
of the United States Constitution and under article 16 of the Massachusetts Constitution. Id. at 
854, 401 N.E.2d at 366. The Court, however, stated that the Globe failed to brief fully its arti-
cle 16 argument and therefore that issue was not properly before it. Id. In addition, the Globe 
argued that it should be able to assert the sixth amendment right of the accused. Id. Of course, 
as noted above, these constitutional questions were not considered by the Court. The sixth 
amendment argument was raised again in Globe II. The Court disagreed with the Globe's 
contention noting that the defendant, while objecting to the superior court's closure order, had 
filed no appeal. The Court concluded that the sixth amendment rights, being personal in 
nature, could not properly be asserted by the Globe. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1497 n.5, 423 
N.E.2d at 366 n.5. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387 (1979). When the 
case was eventually argued before the United States Supreme Court, the sixth amendment issue 
again was raised. Since the Supreme Court resolved the case on first amendment grounds it 
never considered the merits of this question. 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2618 n.10 (1982). 
" 379 Mass. at 861, 401 N.E.2d at 370. The Court discerned three possible ambiguities in 
section 16A. The first uncertainty concerned the phrase "[a]t the trial." Id. at 851,401 N.E.2d 
at 364. Although the word "trial" is itself ambiguous, having no "single irresistible interpreta-
tion", id. at 852, 401 N.E.2d at 365, and the words "at the" are susceptible to conflicting con-
structions such as "throughout" or "at some time in" or "during part of", id. at 852-53, 401 
N.E.2d at 365, the Court concluded that the phrase "at the trial," when examined in light of 
the intended purposes of section 16A, relates to closure only during that portion of the pro-
ceeding during which the victim testifies. Id. at 861, 401 N.E.2d at 370. With respect to the sec-
ond possible ambiguity, the Court concluded that the word "shall" is used in a mandatory, 
and not a directory, sense. Id. at 863, 401 N.E.2d at 371. The final uncertainty concerned per-
sons not subject to a closure order. Section 16A provides that "such persons as may have a 
direct interest in the case," are not to be removed from the trial. In Commonwealth v. Blon-
din, 324 Mass. 564, 87 N.E.2d 455 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 984 (1950), the Court had 
stated that that language was intended "to distinguish between [those] persons having a 
legitimate reason for being present and [those] mere idle spectators who are often attracted in 
large numbers to sensational trials involving sex issues .... " Id. at 571, 87 N.E.2d at 460. 
The Globe argued that it had a legitimate reason for being at the trial and therefore should be 
included within the exemption. 379 Mass. at 863-64, 401 N.E.2d at 371. Such a construction, 
however, the Court concluded, would totally frustrate the intended purposes of section 16A. 
Id. at 864, 401 N.E.2d at 371. 
•• 379 Mass. at 864,401 N.E.2d at 371. According to the Court, the trial judge, in exercising 
discretion, should conduct a hearing before closing any other portion of the trial. At this hear-
ing all interested parties should have an opportunity to state their reasons for objecting to the 
order. In addition, if the Commonwealth requests closure the burden of demonstrating that 
such closure is necessary to preserve evidence required for a just conviction should be borne by 
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The Globe appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 21 That Court, in, 
turn, vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the Supreme Judicial 
Court22 requesting that the decision be reconsidered in light of the then re-
cent Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 23 Although Richmond News-
papers contained no opinion of the Court, 24 the seven justices who voted for 
reversal agreed that the first amendment guaranteed the public and the press 
a right of access to criminal trials. 25 
In Globe II, the Globe acknowledged that some minor victims of sex 
crimes may be unable emotionally to withstand the rigors of testifying 
unless the courtroom first was cleared. 26 It argued, however, that a closure 
order could be justified only after the trial justice, having first accorded in-
terested parties, including the press, an opportunity to present their posi-
tion, made an independent determination as to the need for closure. 27 It was 
the mandatory feature of section 16A that the Globe believed offended the 
first amendment principle recognized in Richmond Newspapers. 21 The 
Court, of course, disagreed. Although it did note that in Richmond 
it. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge should articulate findings of fact. ld. at 
864-65, 401 N.E.2d at 372. 
" 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1948) provides in part: 
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision 
could be had, may be reviewed by Supreme Court as follows: 
(2) By appeal, where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the 
grounds of its being repugnant to the Constitution ... of the United States, and the 
decision is in favor of its validity. 
22 449 u.s. 894 (1982). 
21 448 u.s. 555 (1980). 
•• Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court. He was joined by Justices 
White and Stevens, each of whom also wrote separate concurring opinions. Separate opinions 
concurring in judgment were written by Justices Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joined, 
Justice Stewart and Justice Blackmun. Justice Powell did not participate. Justice Rehnquist 
dissented. 
" 448 U.S. at 558-81 (plurality opinion); id. at 584-98 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 
598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 601-04 (Blackmun, J. concurring). Although Justice 
Powell did not participate he had previously indicated that the first amendment did confer a 
public right of access to criminal trials. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397-98 
(1979). In Gannett the Court concluded that the sixth amendment did not confer a public right 
of access to pretrial criminal proceedings. Id. at 391. The Court left open the question whether 
the first amendment guaranteed a public right of access to such proceedings. Id. at 391-93. 
In Richmond Newspapers, the Chief Justice commented that the Court was being asked to 
decide, for the first time, "whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to the public upon the 
unopposed request of a defendant, without any demonstration that closure is required to pro-
tect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other overriding consideration 
requires closure." 448 U.S. at 564 (plurality opinion). 
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Newspapers several separate opinions emphasized the unbroken tradition 
and the common law history of open criminal trials as support for the prop-
osition that the first amendment guaranteed a right of public access to such 
proceedings, 29 the Supreme Judicial Court discerned "at least one notable 
exception to this history. In cases involving sexual assaults, portions of 
trials have been closed to some segment of the public even when the victim 
was an adult. " 30 Indeed, as the Court further noted, the seven justices 
voting for reversal in Richmond Newspapers themselves indicated that the 
right of access was not absolute and that certain circumstances could war-
rant the closing of portions of a trial. 31 The question then remaining, the 
Court believed, was whether the interests promoted by section 16A justified 
suspension of the first amendment right of access. 32 In Globe I the Court 
had identified several interests served by section 16A. 33 As noted later by the 
United States Supreme Court, these interests essentially reduced to two, 
namely, ''the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma 
and embarrassment; and the encouragement of such victims to come for-
ward and testify in a truthful and credible manner. m 4 These specific in-
terests, as well as the general governmental interest in protecting minors, 
when weighed against the public's right of access to criminal trials struck a 
•• /d. at 1498-99,423 N.E.2d at 776-77. The plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger as well 
as the opinions concurring in judgment written by Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Stewart 
emphasized the tradition of openness associated with criminal trials as evidence of the fun-
damental character of the right of public access to criminal trials. 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1501, 423 N.E.2d at779. 
" /d. at 1499-1500, 423 N.E.2d at 777. See 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 (plurality opinion) where 
the Chief Justice remarked, "[w]e have no occasion here to define the circumstances in which 
all or parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the public, cf,, e.g., 6 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 
1835 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1976), but our holding today does not mean that the First Amend-
ment rights of the public and the press are absolute." Interestingly, the above cited section in 
Wigmore observes: 
The danger of overcrowding, the risk of violence or brawls, the moral harm of satisfy-
ing puriency in trials of certain crimes- these are the ordinary grounds for exclusion. It 
cannot be doubted that such exceptions are within the judicial power to allow. 
By statute in most states they are expressly sanctioned, either in general terms, or for 
special classes of cases, such as divorce, rape, and the like, or for special classes of per-
sons, such as minors (emphasis in original) J. WIGMORE, supra at 443-45. 
The other justices concurring in the judgment noted that the public right of access to 
criminal trial is not absolute. 448 U.S. at 598, 600. 
,. 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1503, 423 N.E.2d at 779. 
" These interests were defmed as: 1) To encourage minors to initiate complaints and to 
testify, 379 Mass. at 857, 401 N.E.2d at 368; 2) To protect minors from humiliation, embar-
rassment and degradation, id. at 857-60, 401 N.E.2d at 368; 3) To enhance the. likelihood of 
more credible testimony, id. at 860, 401 N.E.2d at 369; 4) To provide sound and orderly ad-
ministration of justice, id.; and 5) To assist in obtaining just convictions. Id. 
•• 102 S. Ct. at 2620-21. 
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balance in favor of the validity of section 16A. 35 As stated by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in concluding, "[a]lthough there is some temporary diminu-
tion of information, we cannot say that Richmond Newspapers requires the 
invalidation of the requirement, given the statute's narrow scope in an area 
of traditional sensitivity to the needs of victims." 36 
Once again the Globe appealed the case to the United States Supreme 
Court. 37 That Court, after disposing of a threshhold question, 38 and after 
explaining the reasoning in Richmond Newspapers, 39 proceeded to analyze 
section 16A. 40 Because section 16A impaired the public's right of access to 
criminal trials, a right now guranteed by the first amendment, the Court ex-
ercised strict scrutiny and considered whether the legislation furthered a 
"compelling governmental interest, and [was] closely tailored to serve that 
interest. " 41 
As noted above, 42 the several purposes served by section 16A, as iden-
tified in Globe I, essentially reduced to two. With regard to the first interest 
- protecting minor victims of a sex crime from physical and emotional 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1506-07, 423 N.E.2d at 781. 
36 Id. at 1507, 423 N.E.2d at 781. 
" Probable jurisdiction is noted at 454 U.S. 1051 (1981). 
" Because the closure order had expired upon the defendant's acquittal, the Court first had 
to decide whether the case was moot. Reasoning that the issue was clearly "capable of repeti-
tion" yet, because of the often short duration of a trial, quite possibly could escape plenary 
review, the Court concluded that the case was indeed a case or controversy within the meaning 
of Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution and therefore was not moot. 102 S .. Ct. at 
2618 (citing Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976); Southern Pac. Terminal 
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). 
" 102 S. a. at 2618-20. Although the right of access to criminal trials is not expressly men-
tioned in the first amendment, that amendment, the Court stated, is broad enough to include 
those rights which, while not explicit, are necessary to effectuate the expressly guaranteed 
rights. Id. at 2619. A core purpose of the amendment is "to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs," Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966), and to foster "com-
munication on matters relating to the functioning of government," Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. at 575 (plurality opinion). The right of access to criminal trials, the 
Court opined, would ensure that those discussions and communications were informed. 102 S. 
a. at 2619. The Court went on to note two aspects of the criminal justice system which further 
explain why the right of access to criminal trials is of constitutional dimension. The frrst was 
the history and tradition of openness associated with criminal trials. Id. "This uniform rule of 
openness has been viewed as significant in constitutional terms not only 'because the Constitu-
tion carries the gloss of history', but also because 'a tradition of accessibility implies the 
favorable judgment of experience.' "Id. (quoting Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 
U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring). In addition, the Court explained, the right of access to 
criminal trials plays a crucial role "in the functioning of the judicial process and government as 
a whole." 102 S. a. at 2620. 
•• 102 s. a. at 2620-22. 
•• Id. at 2620 . 
., Note 32 supra and accompanying text. 
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trauma, the Court concluded that a compelling interest was furthered. 43 A 
madatory closing of the portion of the trial during which the minor testifies, 
however, was not considered by the Supreme Court as the least restrictive 
means of achieving that result. 44 As noted, such a rule fails to consider fac-
tors such as the victim's age or emotional maturity.- Yet those variables 
clearly affect the degree to which a person might be traumatized by giving 
testimony in public. 4' Indeed, a victim might very well desire that the public 
have first hand knowledge as to the acts of degradation to which he or she 
was forced to submit by the accused.4' Yet the mandatory closure rule of 
section 16A would prevent this. If, however, the trial judge were allowed to 
make a case by case determination, then the Court felt that the public's 
right of access and the state's interest in protecting minors could be accom-
modated.47 
The second asserted interest - encouraging minor victims of sex crimes 
to testify, was not considered by the Supreme Court as an actual goal of sec-
tion 16A.41 A victim's name, as well as an account of his or her ordeal could 
be learned from a variety of sources. 4' Once learned, that information could 
be published with impunity." Therefore, to the extent that the Com-
monwealth hoped to encourage such victims to testify by suggesting that 
they would remain anonymous, that goal was not necessarily promoted by 
the statute." Even assuming that section 16A did encourage such victim's 
testimony, that interest would not be compelling.'2 That interest, as noted 
by the Court, could be asserted in numerous instances other than those in-
volving minor victims to sex crimes. 53 Therefore, the Court concluded, sec-
•• 102 S. Ct. at 2621 . 
•• /d. 
•• /d. at 2622. 
•• Indeed, the victims in the instant case apparently had no objection to the press attending. 
They did not, however, want to be interviewed, identified or photographed. This information 
was conveyed to the trial judge prior to trial. 379 Mass. at 846, 401 N.E.2d at 361. 
4' 102 S. Ct. at 2621-22. This is not to suggest that the court, in considering whether to close 
a portion of a trial would have to permit the victim to be cross-examined by those parties who 
might be excluded. The trial court could certainly exercise discretion. It would be necessary, 
however, that the public and the press be given a "meaningful opportunity to be heard on the 
question of their exclusion." ld. at 2622 n.2S (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 
368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)). · 
•• 102 S. Ct. at 2622. 
•• Section 16A would not prevent the press from procuring a transcript, talking with court 
personnel or discussing the proceeding with any persons who were permitted to remain. 
•• 102 S. Ct. at 2621 n.23 (citing Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 49S (1975); 
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979)). 
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tion 16A violated the first 54 and fourteenth amendments" to the United 
States Constitution. 
§ 12.6. Preemption- Employee Benefit Plans. In Commonwealth v. 
Federico 1 the Court considered whether a provision contained in the 1974 
Federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act2 (ERISA) preempted 
a criminal statute within Massachusetts' Health; Welfare and retirement 
Fund Act3 thereby precluding the Commonwealth from prosecuting under 
it. 
A complaint, initiated in the district court, charged the defendant with 
violating Massachusetts General Laws chapter 1510, section 11 for refus-
ing, failing or neglecting to make required contributions to an employee 
benefit plan. 4 The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint contending 
that, among other things, the Massachusetts statute was preempted by Title 
29, § 1144(a) of the United States Code. 5 The district court judge reported 
•• /d. The Court made it clear that its decision was based on the mandatory feature of sec-
tion 16A. Under appropriate circumstances, the public and the press could be banned from at-
tending portions of a criminal trial. /d. at 2622 n.27. 
" The first amendment is incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Gitlow v. 
New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
§ 12.6. ' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1052, 419 N.E.2d 1374. 
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (Supp. IV 1976). ERISA was enacted partly because Congress 
believed that comprehensive and uniform regulations covering employee benefit plans were 
necessary due to the rapid increase in, and economic and social impact of, such programs. For 
a summary of Congressional findings and declaration of policy concerned with the legislation, 
see 29 U.S.C. § 100l(a)-(c) (1976). 
' G.L. c. 1510, §§ 1 et seq. This version of the Act was added by the 1973 Mass. Acts c. 
1169, § l. 
• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1053, 419 N.E.2d at 1375. 
G.L. c. 1510, § 11 provides in pertinent part: 
In addition to any other penalty or punishment otherwise prescribed by law any person 
or employee, and the president, secretary, and treasurer, or officers exercising cor-
responding functions, of a corporation which is an employer, who is party to an agree-
ment to pay or provide the contributions or benefits covered by this chapter . . . and 
who refuses or fails or neglects to pay such contributions or payments within thirty days 
after such payments are required to be made shall be punished by a fine of not more 
than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in a jail or house of correction for not 
more than one year, or both. 
' 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (Supp. IV 1976) provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter 
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of 
this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect 
on January 1, 1975. 
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the case to the appeals court. 6 Sua sponte, the Supreme Judicial Court 
removed the case to its own docket. 7 
The Commonwealth argued that the doctrine of preemption was inap-
plicable because, in its opinion, no actual conflict existed between chapter 
1510, section 11 and ERISA,• and moreover, that even if the preemption 
doctrine were initially applicable, section 11 constituted a "generally ap-
plicable criminal law" and therefore was within the exception provided for 
under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4). 9 
As noted by the Court, because the doctrine of preemption emanates 
from the supremacy clause of the federal constitution, 10 a court must set 
aside the state law where Congress, by using explicit language, has "un-
mistakably ... ordained" 11 that the federal legislation supercedes the state 
enactment. 12 Only when Congress has not been so unequivocal should the 
court decide whether application of the state law would frustrate the pur-
pose of the federal law. 13 Here, the Court found the mandate of section 
1144(a) explicit! 4 "Except as provided in subsection (b) ... the provision 
of (ERISA) shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now 
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan .... " 15 In addition, 
ERISA's legislative history clearly indicated Congress' intent that the doc-
trine of preemption not be limited solely to those areas where an actual con-
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1054, 419 N.E.2d at 1376. The trial judge reported the case pur-
suant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34 which provides: 
If, prior to trial, or, with the consent of the defendant, after conviction of the defend-
ant, a question of law arises which the trial judge determines is so important or doubtful 
as to require the decision of the Appeals Court, the judge may report the case so far as 
necessary to present the question of law arising therein. If the case is reported prior to 
trial, the case shall be continued for trial to await the decision of the Appeals Court. 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1054, 419 N.E.2d at 1376. G.L. c. 211A, § 12 provides that "[t]he 
supreme judicial court may order any matter, in whole or in part, or any issue therein, pending 
before the appeals court, transferred to the supreme judicial court for further proceedings." 
' 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1055-56, 419 N.E.2d at 1376. 
• Id. at 1057, 419 N.E.2d at 1377. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4) (1976 & Supp. 1980) provides that 
"[s]ubsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal law of a 
State." For a description of section 1144(a) see supra note 5. 
10 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1056, 419 N.E.2d at 1377. U.S. Const. art. VI provides in perti-
nent part: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pur-
suance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the land .... " 
" 1981 Masss. Adv. Sh. at 1056, 419N.E.2d at 1377 (quoting Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. 
v. Kalo Buick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981)). 
12 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1055-56, 419 N.E.2d at 1377. 
" /d. at 1055, 419 N.E.2d at 1377. As noted by the Court, the majority of the cases discuss-
ing the doctrine of preemption, including those cases cited by the Commonwealth, concerned 
legislation in which congressional intent to preempt was not immediately apparent. /d. at 1055 
n.S, 419 N.E.2d at 1377 n.5 (citations omitted). 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1086, 419 N.E.2d at 1377. 
" 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (Supp. IV 1976). 
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flict appeared but rather, that it be applied in its broadest possible sense. 16 
Therefore, the only question remaining was whether section 11 was a 
"generally applicable criminal law" withift the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 
1144(b)(4). 17 
According to Chief Justice Hennessey, section 11 was not "generally ap-
plicable'' because prosecution under it was limited both in terms of the per-
sons who could be charged and the circumstances under which they could be 
charged. 18 Only employers who failed, refused or neglected to make a re-
quired contribution to an employee benefit plan could violate section 11. In 
order for a law to be "generally applicable" the Court felt that it had to be 
directed against the population at large. 19 Therefore the Court concluded 
that 29 U .S.C. § 1144(a) preempted section 11 and thereby barred the Com-
monwealth from prosecuting under it. 20 
16 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1056, 419 N.E.2d at 1377. 
" Id. at 1057,419 N.E,2d at 1377. For a description of section 1144(b)(4) see supra note 9. 
" 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1057, 419 N.E.2d at 1377-78. 
" Id. The Court concluded that only those criminal laws directed toward the public at large, 
such as larceny or embezzlement, as opposed to those laws specifically concerned with 
employees benefit plans, fell within the exemption. However, in Goldstein v. Mangano, 99 
Misc.2d 523, 417 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1978), a civil court for Kings County concluded that prosecu-
tion under a statute very similar to section 11 was not barred under 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
Because the statute affected all employees, that court felt that it was a criminal law of general 
application. Id. at 532, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 373. 
•• 1981 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1058, 419 N.E.2d at 1378. 
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